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We calculate various indicators of the utilisation of preferences granted to developing countries by 
the EU and the US in the agricultural, food and fisheries sector. We conclude that only a very small 
proportion of the imports eligible to these preferences is actually exported outside a preferential 
regime. The rate of utilisation is therefore high. However, the flow of imports from poorest 
countries remains very limited in spite of rather generous tariff preferences, which leads to question 
the overall impact of the preferential agreements. In addition, preferential regimes overlap, and in 
such cases some regimes are systematically preferred to others. We use econometric estimates of 
the (latent) cost of using a given preference in order to explain why particular regimes are used. We 
focus on possible explanations, such as the cumulation rules (that restrict the use of materials 
originating from other countries), fixed administrative costs, and differences in the preferential 
margin. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of the paper is to assess how the non reciprocal preferences that theEuropean Union 
(EU) and the United States (US) grant to developing countries are utilized, and what are the 
determinants of the possible under-utilization of the various possible regimes. 
The EU and the US, as well as other developed countries, provide developing countries (DCs) 
preferential access to their markets through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); the EU 
"Cotonou" agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries; and several regional 
United States (US) schemes such as the Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA). In this paper, we 
focus on non-reciprocal agreements, but preferential access is also granted to developing countries 
under bilateral reciprocal arrangements, such as the EU-South Africa and the US-Morocco 
agreements.  
The GSP and the other Non-Reciprocal Preferential Regimes (NRPRs) rely on the concept of 
“Trade as Aid”. Since the 1970s, Trade as Aid has been thought to be a more effective way to 
promote development than the funding of projects, which generated rent seeking and whose impact 
often fell often short of the expected benefits (e.g. Easterly, 2001). Nevertheless, these trade 
preferences have been questioned, and it is now suggested that direct assistance payments could be 
a more efficient way of transferring income to DC producers (Anderson, 2004). Critics claim that 
preferences simply do not work because: NRPRs are limited in scope and exclude products that are 
important for developing countries' economies; many unilateral agreements are temporary and 
introduce an element of uncertainty which is unfavourable to investment and the creation of long-
term trade flows; the administrative cost of proving eligibility for preference wipes out part of the 
preference margin while rules of origin limit the benefits (Panagaryia, 2003). These claims are 
supported by the fact that preferential tariffs have not generated significant trade flows (Brenton 
and Ikezuki 2004). Other critics claim that when preferences work they have perverse effects. It is 
claimed that: discrimination between certain regions or countries simply results in trade diversion   3
so that the benefits for some DCs are achieved at the expense of other DCs (Panagaryia 2003; IPC 
2004); non-reciprocal agreements are used as instruments of foreign policy rather than development 
(Onguglo, 2001); they divide DCs in multilateral trade negotiations and undermine regional 
cooperation agreements (Michalopoulos, 1999; Hallaert, 2000, Limao and Olarreaga, 2006); they 
ossify production structures under sheltered market niches (Anderson 2004); they encourage 
corruption through the creation of rents (e.g. allocation of exports licences). Some authors even 
claim that countries which do not benefit from preferences can end up exporting more and being 
eventually better off (Ozden and Reihnardt, 2003). 
None of these arguments is fully compelling. The authors who point out the poor performance of 
countries that benefited from these preferences have seldom provided convincing evidence about 
the counterfactual situation without preferences. Econometric results are ambiguous, and some 
suggest that these preferences have significant positive effects on growth (Pomfret 1997; Romalis 
2003). Following a detailed examination of the effect of ACP preferences, Stevens and Kennan 
(2004) find that only 2.4% of ACP exports failed to use existing preference opportunities, 
concluding that "the system works but should be extended". Because opponents often criticize 
NRPRs for not going far enough or for including side conditions that limit the export possibilities 
offered, one may question whether the main issue they raise is the preference itself or the lack of 
preferences. 
In this paper, we assess the utilisation of EU and US NRPRs in the agri-food sector and the impact 
of these preferences as far as trade flows are concerned. We find that only a very small proportion 
of the trade eligible to NRPRs preferences is actually exported outside a preferential regime, 
resulting in a high rate of utilisation. However, the flow of imports remains very limited, especially 
from poorest countries. Because some regimes seem systematically preferred to others, we use 
econometric estimates of the cost of using a given preference in order to identify the factors that 
determine this utilisation.   4
1. Non reciprocal preferences for developing countries 
EU preferences. The EU grants non-reciprocal tariff concessions to imports originating from 
certain developing under the GSP. The new GSP scheme enables 112 developing countries and 66 
territories to export agricultural products to the EU at reduced rates of duty. Since January 2006, a 
set of additional tariff reductions has been applied to countries complying with international 
agreements on environmental protection, child labour and forced labour, and the special scheme 
granted to countries that carry out anti-drug campaigns ("GSP Drugs" regime, concerning 12 
Andean and Central American countries plus Pakistan) has been reformed. These preferences now 
fall under a "GSP plus" framework covering sustainable development and good governance. In 
2001, in the context of GSP, the EU introduced the "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative in 
favour LDCs. Under the EBA, all products from 49 LDCs can enter the EU duty free without 
quantitative limitation (except rice and sugar, which are subject to a transition period until 2009).
1  
The Lomé Convention, which covers the cooperation agreements with the ACP countries, was 
replaced in 2000 by the Cotonou agreements. The 77 countries covered are also eligible to the GSP, 
including 40 eligible for the EBA. Non-reciprocal tariff preferences have been maintained on an 
exceptional and transitional basis until the end of 2007, but must then be replaced by reciprocal 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs). 
An association arrangement binds the EU with states in the Association of Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCTs). Depending on their legal status, some of these territories are eligible to the 
GSP. Some trade agreements in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership framework also involve 
preferential access to the EU market, albeit a limited one for agricultural products, even though 
they no longer fit into the category of "non reciprocal" agreements because of increased reciprocity 
over time. 
                                                 
1 There are 50 LDCs in all, but Myanmar is excluded from EU EBA for human rights reasons.   5
The new (2006) EU GSP significantly improves the coverage of the agricultural and food sector. A 
large number of products now enter the EU duty free under this regime. However, some 
agricultural products are still excluded. In addition, tariff reductions are limited for some 
agricultural goods. As part of the GSP, the EBA provides a much more generous set of preferences 
in terms of product coverage and preferential margin for the exports originating from LDCs. The 
(transitory) Cotonou regime also has a broad coverage, and most of the preferential tariffs are set to 
zero, though preferences are still restricted for products which continue to be protected under EU 
CAP market regimes. In particular, sugar, beef, bananas are only eligible for preference up to a 
particular volume of imports under the Cotonou agreement.  
US preferences. The US NRPRs include the GSP and the preferences granted on a regional basis, 
i.e. the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the ATPA (Andean Trade Preference 
Act, replaced in 2003 by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act or ATPDEA), and 
the 2000 Trade and Development Act. The latter includes the AGOA and the CBTPA (Caribbean 
Basin Trade Partnership Act). All eligible imports under these preferential schemes take place duty 
free.  
Under the GSP, the US grants preferences to 131 and developing transition countries and some 19 
territories.
2 The US GSP contains specific conditions for a list of 42 LDCs, giving them access duty 
free for a larger set of products. The CBERA provides duty free access to 24 Central American and 
Caribbean states and territories. Since 2005, the Central American Free Trade Area (CFTA) 
agreement with Central American countries and the Dominican Republic has de facto included 
preferences that were granted on a non-reciprocal basis into a reciprocal agreement. The US grants 
preferences to four South American countries under the ATPDEA. The AGOA covers 36 sub-
                                                 
2 Note that the US definition of a LDC differs from that of the United Nations, and some countries are excluded from 
the preferences because of political or human rights reasons.   6
Saharan countries. A large number of products eligible under a regional preference are also eligible 
for the GSP.
3 
Exclusions. The EU and US GSP schemes largely exclude agricultural products that would 
compete with local production such as beef and sugar (EU) or tobacco, rice and cotton (US). In the 
EU, these "sensitive" products can be imported at preferential rates under the Cotonou agreement, 
but are subject to strict quotas. In the case of the US, when these products are eligible for 
preferences, they remain subject to the overall quantitative ceilings under WTO commitments. That 
is, non reciprocal preferences are withdrawn for such products when the WTO tariff rate quota is 
filled, even when filled by countries that are not eligible for these preferences. Some countries are 
excluded from the benefits of the US GSP for not meeting certain programme qualifications, such 
as protecting intellectual property, or not providing access to US goods and services, or failing to 
respect some workers rights, or because their GNP per capita exceeds international threshold levels.  
A "graduation" mechanism limits exports of particular products under the GSP. The purpose of 
graduation is to share the benefits of the preferences between developing countries. In the EU, a 
formula based on the development index and the degree of specialization of the exporting country, 
was used to prevent exporters that are very competitive in particular products from taking an 
"unduly" large share of the market. Under the new GSP, graduation is now based on a simple 
criterion that no longer relies on development indexes. Graduation is now triggered when a group 
of products (defined as a "section" of the statistical classification) from a particular country exceed 
15% of the EU imports of the same products under GSP over the last three consecutive years 
(LDCs do not face such restrictions). In the US, the "Competitive Need Limits" also remove the 
preferences for those countries that take a large share of the market, though LDCs are also 
unaffected.  
                                                 
3 For a more complete description of the US preferential regimes see Dean and Wainio (2006).   7
2. The utilisation of the preferences 
Several authors have claimed that the preferential arrangements of the US and the EU were under-
utilized (UNCTAD-WTO, 2000; Mattoo et al 2002; Brenton, 2003). The main reasons put forward 
to explain this under-utilisation refer to the constraints of rules of origin. The cost of complying 
with requirements relating to certification, traceability and administrative documentation is also 
invoked. Uncertainty regarding the eligibility to preferences, and the risk of financial penalties if 
later found in violation of complex rules, has also been mentioned. In the following sections, we 
assess whether preferences are indeed under-utilized in the agricultural and food sector, and we 
attempt to identify the main explanatory factors. 
Data. The US International Trade Commission (USITC) provides data on imports under each 
preferential regime for the US. Here, we used data at the 8 digit level, and the ad valorem 
equivalent of specific tariffs developed by the USITC. We used the CIF value of imports in order to 
be consistent with the data available in the EU. These data are freely available from USITC. 
Access to EU data is more difficult. There is no official compilation of statistics on EU imports 
under each preferential regime. As a result, EU authorities do not provide such data to international 
organizations.
4 However, EU importers must fill a declaration at customs which takes the form of a 
"Single Administrative Declaration" or SAD. This is the primary source for the data on values and 
quantities that is used by Member countries and Eurostat (the statistical office of the EU) to 
compile external trade statistics. However, in addition, the SAD includes information on the tariff 
regime, which has so far not been used in the external trade database. This is the source we use in 
this study. However, the data is unprocessed and the information is based on the duty requested and 
not the duty collected. Because this declaration is made under the importer's responsibility, some 
claims might be erroneous (e.g. claims to import under the GSP from a non-eligible country, which 
                                                 
4 This explains that, for example, the WTO’ Integrated database (IDB) does not provide this information for the EU, 
and the UNCTAD’s TRAINS and the World Bank’s WITS dataset do not include all preferential regimes.   8
will then be denied by EU customs). Significant work is needed to control and correct declarations 
so as to retrieve the actual regime that will eventually be used. , Algorithms were constructed to 
check the consistency of the declaration with the regulation, as expressed in the official Integrated 
Tariff of the Community (TARIC). Erroneous claims (roughly 5% of the declarations) were 
identified and corrected so as to be consistent with the regulation. The overall trade flow was 
checked for consistency with the Comext data. Eventually only 0.1% of the value of EU agri-food 
imports could not be safely allocated to a particular regime. Data for each import flow under a 
particular regime are matched to the corresponding tariff.  
Indicators. There are several ways to define the utilisation of preferences. We call our first 
indicator the apparent rate of utilisation of a particular agreement. It is defined as the ratio of the 
value of actual imports under a given NRPR, to the value of imports eligible to this NRPR. It 
provides information of the utilisation of the regime, but it ignores the fact that a regime can be 
under-utilized simply because there may be other, equally or more generous, options for exporters.  
The second indicator takes into account the fact that a product is often eligible to two preferential 
regimes, and that the export can only take place under one of them. We call this second indicator 
the actual rate of utilisation. For a particular regime, say GSP, the actual rate is the value of 
imports eligible to the GSP scheme which are imported from the GSP eligible countries under any 
preferential regime, as a ratio of the total value of imports eligible for the GSP, including those 
imported under the MFN regime. 
Our third indicator is the aggregate rate of utilisation: the ratio of the imports from a given country 
under any NRPR and the imports eligible under these NRPRs. This indicator takes into account the 
overall utilisation of NRPRs, given the fact that several of them overlap in terms of product 
coverage.    9
These three indicators are based on a ratio where the numerator is the value of actual exports by the 
developing country to the EU or the US. In some cases, non-preferential tariffs are prohibitive. In 
this situation, exports under either preferential conditions or not may both be minimal but the ratio 
of exports under the preferential regime and (actual) exports eligible would be close to 100%. In 
other words, the preference utilisation rates will provide a biased image of the actual utilisation of 
the preference. We define the potential rate of utilisation as the ratio of exports of a particular 
(developing) country to the EU or US under a set of preferences to the total exports of this country 
to all destinations. This indicator makes it possible to compare the actual preferential exports to the 
export potential of the particular country. It helps identifying the upward bias of the utilisation rates 
defined previously when non-preferential tariffs are prohibitive. 
The utilisation of preferences in the EU. Overall, a very substantial volume of imports takes place 
under NRPRs in the EU. Imports under non-reciprocal regimes account for 20% of the total EU 
imports in the agro-food sector, that is roughly 30% of MFN-dutiable imports (One third of EU 
imports are subject to zero tariffs under MFN).  
Table 1. EU imports of agro-food products under various regimes (2002) 
 
    Regime  Country eligible  Value of imports 
Million euros 
Share in total 
imports 
  Preferential imports from developing countries    13 316  20.01% 
    Non reciprocal preferences     
      Cotonou  Africa, Caribbean, Pacific  5 500  8.26% 
      GSP (excluding East Europe)  Almost all developing countries  4 257  6.40% 
      GSP "plus" (drugs)   Countries fighting drug trafficking  1 714  2.58% 
      Everything but arms   Least developed (except Myanmar)  294  0.44% 
    Others  Overseas  territories.  399  0.60% 
    Reciprocal preferences        
      Bilateral agreements with developing 
countries 
Maghreb, Mashrek, etc.  1 153  1.73% 
  Imports under a zero MFN duty from developing 
countries 
All developing countries  15 567  23.39% 
  Imports under a non zero MFN duty from developing countries  11 724  17.61% 
  Total imports from developing countries  40 737  61.20% 
  Total EU imports  66 559  100.00% 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Gallezot, souceTaxud and TARIC-Eurostat, Chapters 1 to 24 of the Harmonized system, 2002. GSP indicates the 
Generalized System of Preferences. MFN stands for Most Favored Nation. 
 
   10
Trade under NRPRs is larger than trade under reciprocal agreements, even including trade with the 
ten acceding members of the EU under the association agreements in 2002. The largest volume of 
preferential imports takes place under the Cotonou agreement (Table 1). Imports under the Cotonou 
agreement account for 8.3% of total imports, i.e. roughly 13% of all MFN-dutiable imports of the 
EU. Imports under the GSP are also significant, representing almost 10% of the dutiable imports 
from all origins. 
Table  2 provides information on the rate of utilisation of the EU preferences for developing 
countries. The image given by the low apparent rate of utilisation of some preferential regimes is 
somewhat misleading, since a large share of the imports eligible for a particular NRPR is also 
eligible for another preferential regime. For example, the apparent rate of utilisation of the GSP is 
only 50%, but many products eligible for the GSP are also eligible for other preferences. A large 
share of the imports eligible for the GSP is actually imported under the Cotonou regime. Hence, 
rather than indicating under-utilisation of the GSP per se, the apparent rate of utilisation here 
indicates competition between two systems of preference. In total, only 14% of the imports eligible 
for the GSP actually take place under the MFN regime, i.e. without preferences, so the actual rate 
of utilisation of the GSP is 86%.  
Similarly, the low apparent rate of utilisation of the EBA (17% of the imports eligible actually use 
the EBA regime) is largely due to the fact that imports eligible to the EBA enter the EU under the 
Cotonou regime. Indeed, in 2002, African countries exported 95% of their total under the Cotonou 
regime, although they had the choice between the Cotonou and the EBA preferences. Overall, only 
4% of the imports eligible to the EBA entered the EU under the MFN regime, and the actual rate of 
utilisation was therefore 96% (Table 2).   11









Actual Import under 
regime 
1000 Euros 
Apparent rate of 
utilisation 
 
Actual rate of utilisation 
Non reciprocal regimes  [1]  [2]  [3]=[2]/[1]  Imports eligible to a particular 
regime but entering under any of 
the 4 preferential regimes / [1] 
Total  18 609 825  12 292 289  89%   
Cotonou (ACP)  5 926 849  5 500 091  92.8%  95% 
GSP (regular)  8 754 532  4 385 644  50.1%  86% 
GSP-Drug  1 833 684  1 714 354  93.5%  95% 
E.B.A   1 682 244  293 527  17.4%  96% 
Source: Computations by J. Gallezot, from Taxud (Single administrative declaration) and TARIC data, based on CIF imports data for 
2002, chapters 1 to 24 of the HS96. The effective rate of utilisation is constructed as the ratio of imports under any preference to the 
total imports eligible to a given reference. GSP Drug indicates the special GSP provisions for countries combating drug trafficking. 
EBA is the Everything But Arms Initiative. MFN stands for Most Favored Nation.  
 
Overall, considering all NRPRs as a whole and accounting for the effects of the overlapping 
regimes, only 11% of the EU imports eligible for one or several preferential regimes do not use any 
preference. That is, the aggregate rate of utilisation of EU NRPRs is 89%. The low apparent rate is 
nevertheless informative. These data clearly indicate that, given the choice, exporters prefer the 
Cotonou regime over the GSP and the EBA. Thus, the apparent rate of utilisation of the Cotonou 
preferences (93%) is very close to the actual  rate (95%).
5 This raises the question of the 
motivations of the choice of a particular regime.  
Utilisation of preferences in the US. US agri-food imports mainly originate from developed 
countries (Table 3). Imports from developing countries are mostly tropical products facing a zero 
MFN duty. That is, imports from developing countries that actually enter the US under a 
preferential regime represent 12.7% of US imports, and half of these are imports from Mexico 
under the NAFTA. Overall, imports under NRPRs account for 6.2% of all US imports, and 13% of 
US dutiable imports (figures for 2002). 
                                                 
5 Note that the apparent rate of utilisation of the GSP-Drugs regime is also high (93%). The explanation is that 
countries that use these preferences (South American countries) are not eligible for other regimes such as the ACP, and 
they export products that face high MFN tariffs.    12
The largest flows of imports from DCs occur under the GSP regime. GSP imports represent 2.2 % 
of US imports (or 5% of US MFN dutiable imports) in the food sector. It is noteworthy that the 
import flows under the CBERA are roughly similar to the import flows under the entire GSP, while 
the CBERA covers only 14 relatively small countries. The ATPA accounts for 0.68% of total 
imports (or 1.4% of US dutiable imports), and the AGOA a mere 0.23% of total imports (0.4% of 
dutiable imports), with roughly 137 millions USD of imports (Table 3). 
Table 3. US imports of agro-food products under various regimes, 2002 
 
    Regime  Country eligible  Value of imports 
Million USD 
Share in total 
imports 
  Preferential imports from developing and emerging countries  7 607  12.70% 
    Non reciprocal preferences     
      Africa Growth Opportunity Act  Sub Saharan Africa  137  0.23% 
      Andean Trade Promotion Act  4 Andean countries  408  0.68% 
      Caribbean Basin Initiative  Caribbean and Central America  1 629  2.72% 
      GSP (except Eastern Europe)  Most developing countries  1 350  2.25% 
      GSP for LDCs  US list of LDCs  17  0.03% 
   Reciprocal  preferences       
      Bilateral agreements with developing 
countries 
Jordan, Gaza, Chile, etc.  22  0.04% 
      Mexico under the NAFTA  Mexico  4 044  6.75% 
  Imports under a zero MFN duty from developing countries  20 811  34.74% 
  Imports under a non zero MFN duty from developing countries  14  0.02% 
  Total imports from developing countries  28 417  47.43% 
  Total US imports    59 910  100.00% 
Source: Authors using data from USITC. Figures for 2002, Chapters 1 to 24 of the Harmonized system. GSP indicates the 
Generalized System of Preferences. MFN stands for Most Favoured Nation. 
 
Table 4 shows the utilisation of the various US NRPRs. The rate of utilisation of the ATPA (later 
replaced by the ATPDEA) is the lowest, with an apparent rate of 43% for the four countries 
eligible (Table  3). However, this figure is explained by some particular factors in 2002, and 
probably underestimates the actual utilisation of the regime under more normal conditions.
6 The 
                                                 
6 The ATPA expired on December 4 2001, and even though it was renewed retroactive to that date on August 6 2002, 
this had a significant impact on 2002 imports. Indeed, during the period where ATPA was not in effect, imports were 
subject to MFN duties. Duties paid later qualified for refund when ATPA was renewed, retroactive to the dates it had 
expired. However, the USITC does not move imports back from MFN to ATPA in the statistics, when this is the case. 
We thank John Wainio for pointing this out. According to his estimates (personal communication), the apparent rate of 
utilisation was 93% in 2001 rising to 99% in 2003, suggesting that 68% substantially underestimates the real rate for 
2002.    13
apparent rate of utilisation of the GSP is 58%. However, a product eligible to the GSP can 
sometimes enter US territory duty-free under a competing scheme, CBERA, AGOA or ATPA. As 
with the EU, the overlapping of preferences suggests that the actual rate of utilisation is a more 
informative indicator. The actual rate is 94% in the case of GSP, 85% in the case of AGOA and 
99% in the case of ATPA preferences. Altogether, the aggregate rate of utilisation rate for non-
reciprocal preferences is 87%, this figure being probably a lower bound given the statistical 
problem for the ATPA for that particular year. 
 




Imports eligible, by 
regime, 1000 USD 
Actual import under 
the regime 
1000 USD 
Apparent rate of 
utilisation 
Actual rate of utilisation 
Non reciprocal 
regimes 
[1]  [2]  [3]=[2]/[1]  Imports eligible to a particular 
regime but entering under any of 
the 4 preferential regimes / [1] 
Total  4 136 950  3 606 911  87%   
AGOA  161 928  137 202  85%  85% 
ATPA  959 224  408 319  43%  65% 
CBI  1 689 600  1 629 023  96%  99% 
GSP (regular)  2 455 655  1 415 038  58%  94% 
GSP-LDCs  83 010*  17 329  21%  87% 
      
* Excluding eligibility to regular GSP. Source: computation by authors from USITC data, based on CIF imports for 2002, chapters 1 
to 24 of the HS96. The effective rate of utilisation is constructed as the ratio of imports under any preference to the imports eligible 
for a given preference. AGOA is the Africa Growth Opportunity Act. ATPA indicates the Andean Trade Preference Act.  CBI is the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (now CBERA and CBTPA) 
 
Again, as with the EU, some agreements seem to be favoured by exporters when the product is 
eligible to several preferential regimes. For example, the analysis of flows when preferences 
overlap suggests that CBERA is systematically preferred when the product could also be imported 
under GSP. However, in contrast to the EU, the preferential margin does not appear to affect the 
choice of the exporter, since all duties are zero under US NRPRs in the case of agricultural and 
food products. Clearly, other aspects, such as administrative requirements or rules of origins, must 
interfere. 
   14
3. The determinants of preferential exports  
Tables 1 to 4 show that the low apparent rate of utilisation for certain regimes is largely explained 
by the eligibility of a given product to alternative regimes. When exporters to the EU or the US are 
given the choice, they seem to favour a particular regime (e.g. Cotonou in the case of the EU, 
CBERA in the case of the US). A low apparent rate suggests that the corresponding agreement 
provides less benefits than the competing regime, or come with more strings attached. There are 
several explanations. 
In the EU, certain schemes provide larger preferential margins than others, compared to the MFN 
tariffs. This could easily explain the choice of the Cotonou regime when the product is also eligible 
to the GSP. The regular GSP often provides limited tariff reductions compared to the MFN tariffs, 
while most tariffs are zero or minimal under the Cotonou regime. However, this explanation does 
not hold in the case of the competition between Cotonou and EBA regimes, since the EBA tariff for 
a given products is always equal to or lower than the Cotonou tariff.
7  
In the US, all preferential tariffs under NRPRs are zero, so the preferential margin cannot explain 
the choice of one regime over another. However, the use of the CBERA against competing regimes 
that provide an equivalent preferential margin also seems rather systematic. Clearly, there must be 
determinants other than tariffs for choosing a particular regime. We consider administrative 
requirements, agreement-specific costs, rules of origin and differences in the predictability of the 
regime as potential determinants of the systematic choice of a particular regime. 
Predictability. The short time horizons of some preferential schemes and the uncertainty introduced 
by their frequent reviews may encourage exporters to give priority to more predictable 
arrangements. Indeed, in some cases, there is delay and uncertainty about when an agreement will 
be renewed. This is particularly the case with the US preferences (Wainio and Gibson 2003; Dean 
                                                 
7 The apparent utilisation rates for those products eligible only for GSP and only for EBA are 80% and 98% 
respectively. In contrast, when products are eligible for both Cotonou and EBA, the apparent utilisation rates are 93% 
and 4%, respectively.   15
and Wainio 2006). Predictability may explain why the CBERA seems to be favoured by exporters 
when they could also use the GSP. The CBERA has no expiry date, and it can therefore be 
considered as "permanent". The GSP is subject to frequent revisions and a country can be 
graduated each year by unilateral decision, introducing a degree of unpredictability. Delays 
between expiration and renewal (e.g. September 2001 and August 2002 respectively) results in 
uncertainty that deters exports. The same phenomenon characterizes the ATPA.  
However, while this phenomenon may play an important role in explaining the apparent under-
utilisation of some US regimes, it cannot be invoked in the case of permanent and predictable 
regimes such as the EU EBA. 
Rules of origin and administrative costs. Rules of origin requirements have often been invoked as 
an explanation why NRPRs are under-utilized (Brenton and Manchin, 2002; Augier et al, 2003, 
Inama 2003). In most EU agreements, when products contain goods that have not been "wholly 
obtained" in the country benefiting from a preference, the EU imposes some conditions on 
"sufficient transformation" of materials. The exact conditions depend on the regime, but they are 
mainly based on changes in tariff headings (see Stevens 2003). However, there are significant 
differences between agreements regarding the geographical cumulation rules. For example, the 
Cotonou agreement allows for significant diagonal cumulation, meaning that inputs originating 
from countries A or B, used by country C in its exports to the EU will be counted as originating 
from C if A and B are also eligible to the same preference as C. In the case of the GSP, including 
the EBA, however, only a limited regional cumulation was allowed in 2002.
8 
Regarding US agreements, there is usually a requirement that the value-added and the inputs 
originating from the beneficiary country must represent at least 35% of the value of the final 
                                                 
8 Cumulation is allowed between the countries belonging to either the Association of South East Asian Nations. It is 
also allowed between members of the Andean Community, members of the Central American Common Market and 
members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. The cumulation is only within each of these 
groups, not between countries belonging to different groups (there are a few exceptions for textiles made in some 
LDCs).   16
product. Regional cumulation means that some associations of countries are treated as one country 
(Andean Group, Association of South East Asian Nations, Caribbean Common Market, West 
African Economic and Monetary Union, Southern African Development Community). There is also 
a limited degree of diagonal cumulation in the sense that ATPDEA eligible countries can use inputs 
from countries eligible for the CBERA. 
Such rules of origin raise difficulties for some countries which cannot find the raw materials or 
other intermediate consumptions within their own boundaries. It is particularly a problem for small 
and/or landlocked countries. Rules of origin constraints require local production even with little 
comparative advantage (though, the US rules of origin, allow material originating from the US to 
be counted as being produced in the benefiting country, up to a given proportion). Such 
requirements result in extra costs.  
Other requirements for eligibility for preferential treatment, in particular the obligations of product 
tracking and traceability, the administrative formalities, the obligations of documentation, etc. also 
involve significant costs (Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2003). All these costs add to the regular 
administrative costs for preferential trade, and. could be significant cause of low utilisation of 
preferences.  
Assessing the costs of compliance. Carrere et al (2004) proposed a method for estimating the tariff 
equivalent of compliance costs. Their method relies on the idea that the importer balances the 
preferential margin and the costs of compliance. They use a latent variable approach to estimate the 
cost of compliance.
9 Francois et al. (2006) use an sample-splitting method that identifies a 
                                                 
9 Their approach consists in recovering the cost of compliance from a limited dependent variable (a Tobit estimation of 
the rate of utilisation of the preference depending on the preferential margin and an index characterizing the degree of 
restrictiveness of the rules of origin). Note that they attribute these costs to rules of origin requirements, but in practice 
their estimates capture a broader set of costs.   17
threshold as the preferential margin below which traders have no incentive to ask for preference 
because the costs of obtaining the preference exceeds the benefits. 
10 
A very simple approach, based on the "revealed preference", can be applied to the EU and US 
NRPRs, as a first approximation of the costs of compliance. It can be assumed that the preferential 
margin is larger than the cost of compliance if the rate of utilisation of preference is 100%. This 
assumption allows us to estimate an upper bound to the cost of compliance. The preference margin 
for the products where the utilisation rate is zero can be used to obtain a lower bound. When the 
utilisation of the preference is partial (i.e. the rate belongs to the |0,1| interval), there is a degree of 
indifference between using the preference or not, so that the preferential margin is offset by the 
costs of compliance. The cost of compliance can be approximated by a particular moment or 
characteristic of an assumed distribution (e.g. average, median, etc.). This method can be used for 
different agreements, different areas of origin, and different degrees of processing of the product 
traded. 
Here, we approximate the cost of compliance by taking the (non weighted) mean of the preferential 
margin for imports characterized by a rate of utilisation located in the |0,1| interval. This is 
obviously a crude indicator, but it nevertheless shows significant differences when we compare 
different agreements, different levels of development of the exporting country and different degrees 
of processing. For example. the indicator suggests that the cost of compliance with EU GSP 
requirements corresponds to a 2.5% tariff for non LDC-countries. The figure reaches 10% for the 
LDCs exporting under the EBA. The estimate is 3% for primary products and 6% for processed 
products under the Cotonou agreement. In the case of the US agreements, the figure ranges between 
5% and 7%, but the costs of compliance could be higher for processed products under the AGOA 
(our estimate is 11%, but this is based on very small flows that do not make it possible to be fully 
                                                 
10 Francois et al (2006) estimate this threshold by regressing the utilisation rate of the Cotonou agreement (and not the 
trade flow as a regular gravity equation) directly on a set of variables that usually characterises the gravity equation.    18
conclusive). Even though this first approximation of the cost of compliance is rudimentary, the 
figures obtained are consistent with the estimates in the literature (Francois et al, 2006; 
Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2003; Carrere and de Melo 2003, 2004). They suggest that, on 
average, the cost of compliance with the NRPR offsets a preferential margin that is significant.  
The characteristics of products imported under competing regimes. A comparison of the imports 
that are eligible to both the Cotonou agreement and the EU EBA shows that most of the imports 
under EBA (65%) are primary products while most of the imports (65%) under the Cotonou 
products are products at the first degree of transformation (e.g. cocoa powder or butter, carded and 
combed cotton, processed fruits and fish, etc.). In addition, while, the share of raw commodities 
eligible to both regimes, but imported under the EBA is relatively significant (12%), it falls to a 
very low level when the products are semi-processed or processed. Imports of processed products 
take place either under Cotonou (49%) or under the MFN (48%) regime. This suggests that it is 
easier to import processed products under the Cotonou than the EBA. The more constraining 
cumulation clauses of the EBA could therefore play a role in the systematic choice of the Cotonou 
regime for products with dual eligibility. 
The rules of origin under the EBA are the same as those of the regular GSP. If we focus on exports 
from non-LDC countries which are eligible for both the EU GSP and the Cotonou regime, this 
phenomenon is much less visible. Indeed, again, a large share (49%) of GSP imports are raw 
materials. But the share of semi-processed (30%) and processed material is significant. In addition, 
there is little difference in the share of products that are imported under the GSP (10%) and the 
Cotonou regime (58%) between raw material and processed products. The most likely explanation 
is that LDCs face even a greater difficulty in complying with the GSP-EBA rules of origin than the 
non LDCs. Supply side constraints, as well as the small size of some of the LDCs and the difficulty 
of finding local materials are likely to raise particular problems.   19
For those products which are eligible for both US GSP and US agreements with the Caribbean 
basin and Central America, the degree of processing also has an impact (albeit limited) on the 
utilisation of the agreement. 72% percent of the raw commodities use the CBI, while the percentage 
of processed products that use the CBI is only 60%. For those products that are eligible to both the 
ATPA and the GSP, there is no significant difference between the degree of processing in the 
utilisation of a given agreement. This can be explained by the rather similar rules of origin clauses 
across US agreements. 
Descriptive statistics confirm that the largest share of those imports which are eligible for a 
preference (Cotonou or GSP in the EU, GSP in the US) and which are imported under the MFN 
regime are small shipments. When the value of the import flow is higher than €5000, the proportion 
of exports that do not use the preference falls considerably. In the case of the EU, descriptive 
statistics also confirm the role of the preferential margin. Clearly, products subject to a low MFN 
tariff are less likely to be imported under a preferential regime, since the cost of compliance is 
likely to outweigh the benefits.  
The determinants of the choice of a particular regime. In order to investigate the determinants of 
the choice of a preferential regime, we consider two possible situations. First, we consider the case 
where the product is eligible to only one NRPR. The exporter faces the choice between this NRPR 
and the MFN regime. In this case, the choice will depend on the preferential margins (in the EU) 
and on the costs of using the NRPR. We use a bivariate probit model to estimate the determinants 
of the choice between the MFN regime and the NRPR. 
Second, we consider the case where a product is eligible to two NRPRs. The exporter has to choose 
between these NRPRs and the MFN regime. In this case there is a possible competition between the 
two preferential regimes and the exporter will compare the preferential margins as well as 
compliance costs. In this case we estimate a multinomial probit model to explain the choice of a 
particular regime when the exporter has three possible alternatives.   20
Among the possible explanatory variables of the utilisation of a particular preferential regime, we 
include the preferential margins between two regimes, the degree of processing of the products, the 
size of the export flow, and some indicators of economic development such as the GDP per 
capita.
11 Data on the GDP per capita in purchasing power parity comes from the International 
Monetary Fund. We use this variable as a proxy for the degree of development of a country, on the 
grounds that exporters in more developed countries will face less difficulty in filling the 
administrative requirements for eligibility to a preference, and also that their own administration 
will be more efficient (transparent and rapid procedures for allocating export licenses, etc.). 
The degree of processing is constructed as an ad hoc variable, taking three different values, to 
capture the difficulties raised by rules of origin requirements. A raw commodity, provided that it is 
eligible for preference, will face little constraint under rules of origin. Constraints will be more 
severe if the product combines several materials. We used the Food and Agricultural Organization 
technical chain diagrams (FAO 1996) to classify goods into three categories: raw commodity; 
processed good using a small number of different materials; processed goods using a large number 
of different materials. Rules of origin will normally impose more constraints on this last category. 
We include the value of shipment on the grounds that, in order to request the preferential treatment, 
exporters face some fixed costs, and that they might prefer to export small shipments under the 
MFN regime to avoid these costs.
12  The preferential margin is, according to the models, either 
relative to the MFN tariff, or to alternative preferences. Note that in the case of the US, all 
preferential tariffs are zero, so the preferential margin is only relative to the MFN tariff.  
                                                 
11 We also attempted to introduce proxy variables that could capture some possible sources of under-utilisation of 
preferences, such as corruption in the allocation of export licenses. However, the corruption index (source, 
Transparency International) did not prove significant in any of the specifications of the model, perhaps because it 
shows too little variability across developing countries.  
12 The variable included in the regression is not the actual individual shipment but the sum of shipments of the exporter 
for that particular year. Source: Single Administrative Unit, data available at the 10 digit level.   21
MFN vs a NRPR: a bivariate probit model. We first estimate a binomial probit model with data on 
shipments under each regime to test the determinants of choosing the MFN regime rather than any 
of the preferential regimes, when the product and the exporting country were both eligible to a 
NRPR. Eligibility for a preference involves a cost c, while there is no such cost involved when 
using the MFN regime. These costs refer to a series of constraints imposed by the preferential 
agreements (administrative documents for eligibility to the regime, traceability of these documents, 
possible certification, costs of complying with rules of origin, etc.). Assume that the cost associated 
with exporting under the NRPR is an unobservable variable defined by a linear combination of 
explanatory variables x,  ε β + = x c  where  j ε  has a normal distribution with zero mean and a 
variance σ
2. We observe the dummy variable y, which indicates whether the MFN regime is chosen 
(y=1) or not (y=0), where this variable is defined as: y=1 if  c c >  and y=0 otherwise.  
The probability of choosing the MFN regime rather than the NRPR is
13: 
) ( ) Pr( ) 1 Pr( Pr β β ε x F x y
MFN = − > = = = , where F is the cumulative 
distribution function of the normal distribution. In this specification, the variables explaining the 
choice of the MFN regime rather than the preference include the preferential margin, the degree of 
processing, the value of shipments and the GDP per capita.  
Table 4 shows that the results conform to expectations, though with some interesting exceptions. 
For both the EU and the US, the preferential margin contributes significantly to a higher use of the 
NRPR In the EU, the higher the degree of processing, the less likely the use of MFN, and the more 
likely the use of preferential regime. This is not the case for US, where the degree of processing 
affects the utilisation of a preference negatively - a higher degree of processing induces exporters to 
use the MFN regime to a greater extent, as would be expected if rules of origin are more difficult to 
meet for processed products. The EU case is somewhat puzzling. A possibility is that sanitary and 
                                                 
13 c is normalized to 0.   22
phytosanitary restrictions (which hamper the exports of raw material more than processed products 
as far as pathogens and invasive species are concerned) interact with the export specialization of the 
different countries and lead to this result. 
For both the EU and the US, the size of shipments contribute significantly to a higher use of the 
NRPRs. This confirm the assumption that there is a fixed cost for using a preference.   
However the positive sign of GDP per capita means that countries with higher GDP per capita tend 
to prefer the MFN regime rather than other more preferential routes. This could be explained, 
perhaps, by the fact that more developed countries  tend to export processed products, and thus face 
rules of origin constraints for transformed products which lead to preference for the MFN regime 
rather NRPRs. However, given that the model already includes the effect of processing, this result 
is difficult to interpret. 
Table 4. Binomial probit estimates: MFN vs one NRPR 
Probit regression          
European Union  Log Likelihood = -11353.837  Number of observations: 16975     
MFN Coefficient  Standard  Error  Z  P>|z| 
GDP/capita .00003***  2.31E-06  11.08  0 
Degree of Processing  -.09***  0.143429  -6.27  0 
Preferential margin  -.015***  .0009988  -15.00  0 
Value of shipment  -.00004***  3.48 E-06  -12.25  0 
Constant .15***  .0281587  5.47  0 
        
United States  Log Likelihood = -3008.2438  Number of observations: 5141     
MFN Coefficient  Standard  Error  Z  P>|z| 
GDP/capita .0000199***  5.99E-06  3.32  0.001 
Degree of Processing  .1039026**  .0428736  2.42  0.015 
Preferential margin  -2.81E-08***  6.31E-09  -4.45  0.000 
Value of shipment  -1.162721***  .3527096  -3.30  0.001 
Constant -.7034272***  .0547139  -12.86  0.000 
***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5% and *:significant at 10%. 
 
 
MFN vs two NRPR: a multinomial probit model. We now consider the case where a given country 
can export to the EU (US) under 3 different regimes. These are, respectively R1 and R2, and the   23
MFN regime is denoted as R3.
14 The ad valorem tariffs associated with a particular regime are ti 
(i=1,2,3). Eligibility for a preference Rj (j=1,2) involves a cost cj.. The cj, are not observed. The 
exporter will compare the benefits of using the preference, i.e. the preferential margin, to the cost of 
using a given regime. If we assume that these costs are fixed, the decision to use a preference rather 
than the MFN regime corresponds to the case where cj <q.p
w(t3-tj). This means that, if this cost is 
expressed as a value of CIF imports, the preferential margin PMj=(t3-tj) is a threshold against which 
cj can be compared. We assume that this cost can be expressed as a linear combination of 
explanatory variables x: j j j x c ε β + =  where  j ε  is a random error term characterized by a density 
function F(.). The probabilities associated with the three trade regimes are: 
) , Pr(
) , Pr( ) Pr(
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
PM x PM PM x x
PM c PM c PM c R choice p
+ − < − + − < − =
< − < − = = =
β ε β β ε ε
 (1)  
) , Pr(
) Pr(
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2
2 2
PM x PM PM x x
R choice p
+ − < − + − < − =
= =
β ε β β ε ε
       (2) 
) , Pr( ) Pr( 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 PM x PM x R choice p + − > + − > = = = β ε β ε                (3) 
The random terms  ) , ( 2 1 ε ε  follow a bivariate normal density, with zero mean and a covariance 
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14 More explicitely R1=GSP and R2=Cotonou,  or R1=GSP and R2=EBA for the EU; R1=GSP and R2=ATPA or 
R1=GSP and R2=CBI for the US.   24
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The results of applying this model to shipments from DCs to the EU under competing regimes are 
shown in Table 5. Here we consider the major determinants of choice of preference to be the size of 
the shipment and the degree of processing. The GDP per capita explanatory variable has been 
dropped from final version of this model because it was not significant. 
In the EU, we first focus on the products that could be exported under either the regular GSP or the 
Cotonou agreement. We then focus on exports that are eligible for both the Cotonou and EBA 
regimes (Table 5). The degree of processing is statistically significant and appears with a positive 
coefficient in the case of the Cotonou regime. This means that the more processed a product, the 
higher the cost of compliance, and the lower the probability of choosing the Cotonou regime. 
Cumulation rules are more restrictive under the EBA and GSP than under the Cotonou agreement. 
As expected, the results confirm that, for small shipments, exporters are less likely to use a 
preference. For products that are jointly eligible to the Cotonou and EBA regimes, and everything 
else equal, the probability of using the EBA rather than the MFN is lower than the probability of 
using the Cotonou agreement for small shipments. This is consistent with the revealed preference 
hypothesis that there are larger fixed costs of compliance are for using the EBA than for using the 
Cotonou regime, perhaps because it takes time to get used to a new regime.    25
Table 5. Multinomial Probit estimates: MFN vs  two NRPR (EU) 
 
European Union  Mean Log Likelihood =  
-.444327 
Number of observations: 1851   
Relative to MFN  Coefficient  Standard Error   
Constant Cotonou  1.33***  .15   
Degree of Processing Cotonou  .26***  .09   
Value of shipment Cotonou  -.51***  .10   
Constant GSP  2.93***  .18   
Degree of Processing GSP  .11  .10   
Value of shipment GSP  -.51***  .11   
      
European Union  Log Likelihood = -.759311  Number of observations: 1471   
Relative to MFN  Coefficient  Standard Error   
Constant Cotonou  .09  .10   
Degree of Processing Cotonou  .39***  .12   
Value of shipment Cotonou  -.76***  .11   
Constant EBA  1.52***  .55   
Degree of Processing EBA  0.33  .43   
Value of shipment EBA  -.42***  .22   
***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5% and *:significant at 10%. 
 
 
In the case of the US, reported in Table 6, the number of observations subject to dual eligibility is 
much smaller than in the EU. Fewer countries and products are eligible to both the GSP and the 
CBI on the one hand, and the GSP and the ATPA on the other hand. The results show that the 
degree of processing decreases the probability of using the CBI relative to the MFN, while, for 
products that are also eligible to the GSP, the size of shipment is not significant for the GSP. Few 
exports eligible to both regimes actually take place under the GSP. Small shipments have a larger 
probability of using the MFN regime, consistent with the assumption that there is a fixed cost for 
using a preference. Estimates suggest that this fixed cost is comparable in the case of the CBI and 
the GSP. Results for imports that are eligible to both the ATPA and the GSP are more surprising, 
even though the parameters are less significant. Again the value of the shipment affects the 
probability of using a preferential regime positively, and the results imply that the implicit fixed 
cost is comparable between the ATPA and the GSP. However, for the US, the degree of processing 
favours the use of a preferential regime, contrary to our rules of origin arguments. This might be   26
due to the particular type of exports of the Andean countries under preferential regimes (tuna, 
processed vegetables, etc.).  
Table 6. Multinomial Probit estimates: MFN vs two NRPR  (US) 
United States  Mean Log Likelihood =  
-.822806 
Number of observations: 835   
Relative to MFN       
Constant CBI  -1.25***  .16   
Degree of Processing CBI  0.1312**  .0749   
Value of shipment CBI  -2.0803***  .4255   
Constant GSP  -.8903***  .1646   
Degree of Processing GSP  .0763  .0768   
Value of shipment GSP  -2.0236***  .4253   
  Log Likelihood =-1.06615  Number of observations: 656   
United States  Coefficient Standard  Error   
Relative to MFN       
Constant ATPA  -.4867***  .5262   
Degree of Processing ATPA  -.1145**  .0718   
Value of shipment ATPA  -.0454*  .0311   
Constant GSP  -.5181**  .2803   
Degree of Processing GSP  .1179**  .0682   
Value of shipment GSP  -.0475**  .0292   
***: significant at 1%, **: significant at 5% and *:significant at 10%. 
 
4- The low imports/high utilisation issue  
The apparent and aggregate rates of utilisation of the preferences are ratios based on actual exports 
(the denominator is the value of exports). Such ratios might be high while the preference fails to 
generate significant trade flows. The high aggregate rates found in this study only tell us that few 
products eligible for preferential treatment are imported outside the preference system. This does 
not mean that the schemes fulfil their objectives. The case of the US AGOA illustrates the paradox: 
85% of food exports from African countries that are eligible under the agreement (and dutiable 
under MFN) do enter duty-free under the scheme. The system is therefore used. Nevertheless, with 
the exception of South Africa, the export flows from almost all countries to the US are very small, 
only a few ten thousands dollars in most cases. That is, a high rate of utilisation does not mean that 
the preferences “work” in terms of actually creating trade.    27
Incomplete product coverage of the preferential scheme may explain that even though the aggregate 
rate of utilisation is high, exports are minimal, provided that MFN tariffs are prohibitive. This 
explanation may be valid for some Asian and South American countries. It does not explain the 
small imports under generous preferential schemes such as the EBA or the US-GSP for LDCs, 
whose product coverage is large. The combination of high MFN duties and administrative obstacles 
for using preferences is another possible explanation. However, several studies (OECD 2005; 
Stevens and Kennan 2002; Djankov et al 2006 combining statistical estimates and surveys of 
importers or exporters suggest that the main explanations for the somewhat disappointing level of 
LDCs exports in spite of the preferences lie outside the issue of tariff protection. Technical 
requirements in the importing countries, supply side constraints and administrative inefficiencies in 
the exporting countries seem to be the main obstacle to a larger use of preferences. Many 
developing countries have not been declared free from a series of animal diseases and are not 
allowed to export meat and dairy products, for example. The capacity of exporting countries to 
meet the quality and traceability requirements imposed by the EU and the US also appear as a 
considerable obstacle to a larger use of available preferences. In many cases, the US and EU 
administrations deems processing plants and control, inspection and certification procedures to be 
deficient (Henson et al, 2000). The standards imposed by the private sector, in particular in terms of 
traceability, control all along the processing chain, liability and certification seem to be difficult for 
LDCs.  
The potential rate of utilisation, i.e. the ratio of the exports to the EU (or US) under NRPRs to the 
exports of the particular country worldwide, provides some useful information. For a given country, 
it shows the importance of the NRPRs outlet relatively to the export capacity of the country for this 
particular set of products. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, this indicator shows contrasting results 
between countries. Exports to the EU under NRPRs account for less than 10% of total exports of 
Benin or Sudan, for example. The percentage is less than 20% for 11 of the 47 sub Saharan   28
countries. However, for 27 of these countries, the NRPRs of the EU account for more than half of 
their exports, and for 9 countries, they account for more than 80% of the exports. This is typically 
the case for most West African countries. For this group of countries, the limitations to more 
exports to the EU are unlikely to be found in the rules of origin, technical or administrative 
requirements of the NRPRs, while in the case of Sudan, an exporter of live animals, SPS measures 
are likely to play a major role. African exports under US NRPRs only account for a small fraction 
of their total exports (most exports of African countries are directed to the EU, which is a market of 
choice for raw material). If administrative or technical rules are an issue, these are general 
constraints, which are not specific to the NRPRs. 
5. Conclusion 
A number of recent studies have concluded that NRPRs are systematically under-utilized by 
developing countries. Our results suggest that that the utilisation rate for non-reciprocal agreements 
is generally very high, even though this sometimes corresponds to very limited trade flows. Barely 
more than 10% of the imports eligible to a preference enter the EU or the US market outside a 
preferential regime. Taken individually, the utilisation rate for some schemes may seem relatively 
low, whether in the EU (the GSP, and especially the EBA component) or in the US (the GSP or the 
ATPA). But this is mostly due to the fact that products are eligible for preferential treatment under 
more than one scheme.  
Some regimes appear to be systematically preferred by exporters when two regimes compete. For 
instance, the Cotonou regime tends to be favoured by exporters to the EU when they have the 
choice with the GSP or even the EBA, and the CBERA regime is often chosen by exporters to the 
US when they have the choice of the GSP. Higher preferential margins (e.g. the Cotonou compared 
to the EU GSP regime) are only part of the explanation. The rules of origin requirements contribute 
to explaining why the Cotonou is preferred to the EU GSP, including the EBA, since Cotonou is 
less restrictive in terms of geographical cumulation. The short term horizon and the uncertainty   29
resulting from annual reviews and possible graduation in the US GSP could explain why the 
CBERA, a more predictable agreement, is often preferred. Econometric estimates support the 
assumption that there is a fixed cost of compliance when an exporter wishes to use a preferential 
regime, and that this is a particular deterrent for small shipments. 
While the rates of utilisation are high, the preferential regimes fail to generate significant export 
flows from some developing countries, in particular most of the sub-Saharan countries and LDCs. 
Rules of origin requirements and partial coverage of the agreements seem to play only a minor role 
in explaining the small export flows. The main explanations seem to lie in the inability of these 
countries to match the technical, sanitary, phytosanitary and traceability requirements imposed by 
developed countries, and in particular the private standards imposed by importers and retailers. This 
suggests that, in order to benefit from the opportunities offered by the EU and US NRPRs, LDCs 
would need technical and financial assistance with their infrastructure and administration and high 
levels of inward investment, which, in terms of our results, would increase the size of export flows, 
and hence the use of preferential agreements. More predictable preferential regimes, with more 
possibilities of geographical cumulation could help foreign investment and, as a result, the 
diffusion of technological and services packages, which seem necessary to meet the quality and 
traceability requirements imposed by the importers. However, many of the obstacles mentioned by 
the importers surveyed by OECD (2005) lie outside the scope of the preferential regimes. Political 
conditions and poor governance, for example, are often mentioned as major deterrents to foreign 
investment and transfers of technology and service, without which preferences are unlikely to 
translate into actual exports. 
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